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Commentary on “What Should a Normative Theory of Argumentation
Look Like?”
DAVID ZAREFSKY
Professor Bermejo-Luque addresses one of the stickiest problems in argumentation theory: how
do we know what is a good argument? This is not exactly the way she puts the question in her
excellent paper, but I believe that is what it quickly comes down to. And stating it this way might
help us to see why it is such a sticky question.
The way Bermejo-Luque introduces the question is to inquire what is the purpose of
argumentation. She answers with the conventional and unobjectionable statement that the
purpose is the justification of claims, and she notes that most theories would concur with this
statement or a variant of it. But that answer immediately raises the subsidiary question of what
counts as justification. Noting that justification is not quite the same as proof (though it
sometimes is called “rhetorical proof”), we might answer – still without flouting convention –
that a claim is justified if there is good reason to accept it and no good reason to reject it. That of
course devolves the question to “What counts as a good reason?” and we are now at the way I
have framed it above.
Even if we had a normative theory of justification, Bermejo-Luque asserts, we still would
not be able to answer the question of what counts as justification of a claim. Nor would we do so,
she maintains, if we used terms such as “rational” or “reasonable,” which really are just
synonyms for “justified.” All these terms are what she calls “unexplained explainers” (p. 1).
There are two easy ways out of the problem, but neither is satisfactory. One is to follow
the path of deductive logic and equate justification with form alone. On this view, an argument is
justified if and only if it is cast in the correct form for an argument of its type – no matter
whether its premises or its conclusion is true, and no matter whether anyone believes it. The
problems with this view for a theory of argumentation have been identified for nearly sixty years
by Toulmin (1958) and others, and there is little need to spell them out again here. Suffice it to
say that neither Bermejo-Luque nor, I suspect, anyone at this conference espouses that view. It
would consign to irrationality just about all the work in informal logic, non-formal approaches to
dialectic, and rhetorical studies of argumentation.
The other potential way out of the question, “What is a good argument?” is to convert a
normative question into a descriptive one. “Good,” of course, seems to be an inherently
normative term, suggesting that we determine what is a good reason by formulating a general
theory of the good and then applying it to the process of reasoning. But why must the question be
normative? Why can’t we understand a “good reason” to be “what arguers take to be a good
reason”? We then would have converted argumentation into a descriptive-empirical study, as
some of the Francophone theorists such as Marianne Doury and Ruth Amossy do. We might
even feel grateful if we found, like van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels (2009), that the working
standards of justification employed by actual arguers are similar to the “rules” stipulated by
normative theorists such as the pragma-dialecticians.
But this latter approach would collapse “justification” into a synonym for
“convincingness” or “persuasion.” It would utterly relativize the concept and it would destroy the
distinction between good and bad, sound and unsound argument. It would make of the statement,
“That conclusion is not justified,” nothing more than a way of saying, “I do not like that
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conclusion,” converting the logical into the psychological and heralding the return of logical
positivism. It does not solve the problem of justification; it banishes it from our concern.
Bermejo-Luque does not endorse this position. In fact, she notes approvingly (p. 2) that even
rhetorical approaches are concerned with what makes argumentation intrinsically good, not
merely successful. As I shall argue later, however, her conclusion functionally comes close to
this positivist response. But first let us consider how she gets there.
Bermejo-Luque examines two approaches to justification. She calls the first
criteriological, determining the goodness of an argument by positing a set of criteria and then
stipulating that an argument achieving those criteria be considered justified, rational, and
reasonable. (She uses these three terms virtually interchangeably (p. 3)). She associates the
criteriological approach with several prominent theories of argumentation, including
epistemological theories, pragma-dialectics, and virtue approaches.
The difficulty, Bermejo-Luque asserts, is that we are immediately led to where the
criteria come from. They seem to be either empirical rules of thumb (“This has worked in the
past”) or constitutive rules similar to the “rules” of logic. But when we begin to question their
rationale, we are led into an infinite regress in which every reason argued for a certain normative
standard could be questioned in turn. I think that Bermejo-Luque is right about this, but only if
one stands outside the particular theoretical perspective on argumentation that is being assumed
in order to derive the normative standard under scrutiny. If one works within a perspective, there
is at its foundation a shared understanding about the perspective itself, an agreement which stops
the infinite regress.
Let us take pragma-dialectics as an example. As I understand it, within the extended
pragma-dialectical framework a justified argument would be one that adheres to the rules for a
critical discussion as they are applied to the communicative activity type that embodies the
argument. Why? Because the purpose of argumentation is to resolve a difference of opinion on
the merits, and those rules are derived from that purpose. The arguer’s interest in strategic
maneuvering is likewise constrained by that purpose. Now, one still can challenge the arguer’s
effort at justification, with questions such as (1) “How do we know that the communicative
activity type is what you say it is?” (2) “What do we mean by ‘on the merits’?” (3) “Who
determines what ‘the merits’ are?” and so forth. These questions could generate vigorous
argument, but I do not think they would lead to an infinite regress. That is because at bottom the
arguers share a commitment to the purpose of the enterprise. When they get to that level, the
would-be infinite regress stops because all arguers have accepted and implicitly maintain the
claim about argumentation’s purpose.
We could reason in similar fashion about the informal logical perspective on
argumentation, the rhetorical perspective, the normative pragmatic perspective, or any other
particular approach to argumentation. Operating within a perspective implies accepting its basic
assumptions. To accept Walton’s informal logic approach, for example, while questioning
whether argumentation is dialogical, would make no sense. To accept a rhetorical perspective
while denying that argumentation is addressed to an audience, would be equally absurd.
In his famous essay on the is-ought problem, Searle (1969) referred to assumptions of
this type as institutional facts, to distinguish them from brute facts. Institutional facts are
assumptions, beliefs, or values that function as facts for those within a given institution. Searle’s
example is the institution of promising, and he concludes that within that institution, the
statement “one should keep one’s promises” is a fact, because the institution of promising would
make no sense were it not true. A person who does not believe in promising or denies that one
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undertakes any obligations by uttering anything could ask “Why should one keep one’s
promises?” and launch into an infinite regress, but a person who operates within the framework
of promising will find such a question meaningless. “Of course one should keep one’s promises,”
he or she would likely reply, “that’s just what promising is.” Each of the different basic
perspectives on argumentation likewise functions as an institution whose basic assumptions
function as facts within that institution.
What happens when adherents of different perspectives on argumentation engage each
other? They start off with different core assumptions and may not have any basic agreement
underlying their disagreement. They might first try to translate across their differing paradigms
to see if there is an implicit agreement after all. When the pragma-dialectician meets the
rhetorician, the former will maintain that the arguer’s dialectical obligations supersede his or her
attempt to persuade an audience, while the latter will maintain that persuading an audience is
how one knows one has met the dialectical obligations. These positions may seem incompatible.
But maybe not: as I have argued elsewhere (Zarefsky 2006), if the universal audience [the
rhetorician’s normative standard] actually existed, it would employ the rules of a critical
discussion [the pragma-dialectician’s normative standard].
If, on the other hand, there really is no underlying agreement, then the arguers are likely
to find themselves in a position that Fogelin (1985) and others have called “deep disagreement,”
and they may indeed enact an infinite regress. What will prevent such an infinite regress is a
rhetorical transformation of the scene, so that the arguers come to see the characterization of the
occasion differently from before and can find a common ground where none was seen before.
This approach sometimes can work, but sometimes not (Zarefsky 2012; Zarefsky, in press).
So what does this suggest about Bermejo-Luque’s first approach to justification, the
criteriological? She has dismissed it as leading to infinite regress. What I have tried to show is
that it leads to infinite regress only when the arguers proceed from different world views or
frames of mind. In many cases, perhaps the majority, that is not the case. The arguers participate
in a world-view anchored in common basic assumptions maintained either explicitly or
implicitly. When they don’t, they may have options that would avoid infinite regress through
reconceptualization of the scene. But they may not.
For those cases, which I suspect Bermejo-Luque believes are far more common than I do,
she has an idea. This is her second approach to the problem of justification, which she labels
transcendental (p. 7) rather than criteriological. She urges that we regard justification from the
perspective of the activity of argumentation. In other words, she suggests that justification is
what arguers do. She says that arguing is a kind of doing, and that whether it is justified or not to
do it depends on our reasons and goals. What is to be justified, then, is our decision to engage in
argumentation rather than the specific arguments we produce. Bermejo-Luque writes that giving
reasons for believing that p is not the same as rendering justified the belief that p” (p. 7). But I
am not sure why not. Why should one believe that p if it is the case that p has not been justified?
Bermejo-Luque writes that whatever counts as argumentation counts as an attempt at
justifying a claim. This is sensible as far as it goes; except for the special case of an insincere
arguer, one reasonably can assume that a person who argues in behalf of a proposition is
attempting to justify it and may well believe that he or she has succeeded in doing so.
In my opinion, this proposal recapitulates the positivist approach to justification that I
criticized above. If an arguer who says, “p is justified” is really saying only “I believe that p,”
then the concept of justification reduces to the concept of “attempted justification” or “selfreported justification.” It eliminates justification as a normative concept and renders incoherent
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what I would take to be a quite meaningful allegation, “You think that p is justified, but it is not.”
If justification is changed from a normative concept to a purely empirical one, marked only by
expressing statements in behalf of a claim, then it seems to me to be rather thin gruel indeed. We
have defined away our problem rather than solving it, and have left ourselves without a way to
distinguish better from worse arguments, having only the recourse of saying that arguments were
more or less persuasive.
Professor Bermejo-Luque has called our attention to an extremely important theoretical
problem, even though I believe that we must dig deeper to find the solution. Considering what
the arguer regards as justification is a necessary first step, but I think it is not enough. We should
add some sort of intersubjective agreement with the audience, because at a minimum the people
to whom an argument is directed must share the view that what the arguer counts as justification
is considered justification for them too. But even that is not enough, because it reduces
argumentation to successful persuasion. I would include in the intersubjective agreement the
argumentation critic, representing Perelman’s universal audience. So not only must the actual
audience find an argument justified, but so too must a hypothetical audience of reasonable
people unhindered by bias, prejudice, or self-interest. The argumentation critic evaluates an
argument by asking, first, whether there is an obvious reason to withhold assent and, second,
whether arguments of the given type usually have turned out to be without flaws.
If the arguer and the argumentation critic find an argument to be justified but the actual
audience does not, then we have a case of a potentially sound argument that for whatever reason
failed to persuade its audience, and then the task is to consider how the argument could be better
fashioned to adapt it to its audience. If the arguer and actual audience find the argument justified
but the argumentation critic does not, then we have a case of audience assent to an insufficiently
justified claim. Most of what we call fallacies would fit within this category. If the arguer himor herself does not believe the argument to be justified, regardless of what the audience and critic
might think, then the arguer is violating the sincerity condition that attaches to the speech act of
making a claim on another’s belief (unless irony, sarcasm, or some similar literary device is
involved). This is a rough guide to where we may take our search for the meaning of justification
beyond the starting point that Professor Bermejo-Luque has so ably provided. It reflects the
rhetorical standpoint that all argumentation is addressed, but I think that anyone other than a pure
formalist would share that notion to some degree. It, after all, is what allows informal logicians,
pragma-dialecticians, rhetoricians, and others to come together on something resembling
common ground.
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